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THE LAW OF SPACE CYBER OPERATIONS:
GRIPPING MYSTERIES, ENTANGLED FRONTIERS, AND
SECURITY CHALLENGES
Roy Balleste*

The developments of technologies applicable to cyberspace and outer space offer
new opportunities. Each nation, institution, and individual must be involved in the
security of cyberspace in order to secure outer space activities, while reinforcing
the legitimacy of that commercial process. The stories that follow consider the
intersection of outer space law and cybersecurity, describing vulnerabilities and
the limitations of implementing international norms. The article assesses the
cyberthreat landscape while offering recommendations. The article's subsequent
sections are organized as follows: Part II, The Cruel Sky, considers a historical
mystery to better understand the contradictory world of cyber operations. Along
the way in looks at humanity and its role to play. Part III, the Human Condition,
takes a closer look at activities on and near Earth. In particular, it assesses a
potential computer fraud originating from outer space. Part IV, Reach for the
Stars, treks in search of recommendations for the safety and future of space
exploration.
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“Something roars not twenty feet from him.
It could be the wind finding a new route through or around an icy serac or
pinnacle, but Crozier knowns that it isn’t.” — Dan Simmons1
I.

Northwest Passage

It was the first age of exploration. The tall ships circumnavigating the
globe mastered the oceans, and its sailors were in search of dreams. The story of
the Northwest Passage belongs in the annals of history as one of the most famous.
While the Spanish conquistadors were risking all, including their lives, to find El
Dorado,2 four hundred years later, the Royal Navy and its brave men traversed the
oceans searching for a new, valuable, and enigmatic place. Now that the
Napoleonic Wars were over, the Admiralty had a new mission for a group of
experienced mariners: to find the Northwest Passage.3 This article is a journey
that addresses that mission. This article is a story within stories designed to help
the reader understand the complexities of the present cyber landscape as the world
enters the second space age. The universes of human knowledge, thought, and
creativity may lead to prosperity or disaster. The Internet has evolved
dramatically in the last twenty-five years. In that time, humanity has benefitted
from the enhancement of commerce, education, and social interactions. As if
skillfully planned, criminal activities followed the commercialization of the
Internet that now, in turn, threaten the present legal order of outer space.4 The
impending frontiers of human exploration will not be easily accessible. With this
in mind, as technological advancements continue to grow and prosper,
cyberthreats are becoming more prominent.5 More specifically, these threats loom
over the technological innovation and security in outer space.6 The present state of
affairs in the world is perilous. For example, the United States, in general, is a

1

DAN SIMMONS, THE TERROR 7 (2007).
See, e.g., JOHN HEMMING, THE SEARCH FOR EL DORADO (2001).
3
PIERRE BERTON, THE ARTIC GRAIL: THE QUEST FOR THE NORTH WEST PASSAGE AND THE NORTH
POLE 1818–1909 16 (1988).
4
Sean B. Hoar, Trends in Cybercrime: The Dark Side of the Internet, 20 CRIM. JUST. 4 (2005). See
also Andre Kwok, The growing threat of cybercrime in the space domain, E. ASIA F. (Sept. 9,
2021), https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/09/09/the-growing-threat-of-cybercrime-in-the-spacedomain/.
5
John Shin, Why Space is the Next Frontier for Cybersecurity, FORBES (Aug. 20, 2021, 07:45am
EDT), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2021/08/20/why-space-is-the-next-frontierfor-cybersecurity/?sh=527a172a41b1.
6
Id.
2
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daily target of cyberattacks.7 Within a twelve-month period during 2020–2021,
the U.S. has been the target of seven major cyberattacks.8
Although, improbable that there have been many more, these seven attacks
have been attributed to Russia in one form or another.9 For example, the meat
processing company, JBS, was hacked via a ransomware attack.10 The hackers
attempted to use the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) email
system to send phishing emails.11 Colonial Pipeline shut down due to a ramson
attack, and hackers breached several U.S. government agencies and companies
“exploiting software made by SolarWinds.”12 The typical user of the Internet
would expect that cyber operations are being governed by international law
standards, in addition to national laws. However, in most cases, the interference of
foreign powers has a more significant influence in policing cyberspace. The
challenge that follows is one of accountability.
The idea of colonizing distant places of our solar system and beyond
offers some tantalizing possibilities. This idea, in many ways, seems to border the
imaginary. The beginning of space technologies originated with nations and has
evolved into the realm of commercial partnerships over time.13 The first age of
exploration began at the start of 1957 when the Soviet Union’s launched the first
artificial satellite, Sputnik I, into space, and in that manner propelled the United
States into a new frontier of space exploration.14 Shortly after that, the first
American satellite was launched into the void, designated as Explorer I.15 On July
7

See generally 2021 Cyber Security Statistics the Ultimate List of Stats, Data & Trends,
PURPLESEC, https://purplesec.us/resources/cyber-security-statistics/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2022).
8
The 10 Biggest Ransomware Attacks of 2021, TOURO COLL. ILL. (Nov. 12, 2021),
https://illinois.touro.edu/news/the-10-biggest-ransomware-attacks-of-2021.php.
9
BERTON, supra note 3, at 16.
10
JBS: FBI says Russia-linked group hacked meat supplier, BBC NEWS (June 3, 2021),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada57338896#:~:text=A%20Russian%20cyber%2Dcriminal%20group,the%20US%2C%20Canada%
20and%20Australia.
11
Joe Walsh, Here Are Some Of The Major Hacks The U.S. Blamed On Russia In The Last Year,
FORBES (June 1, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/joewalsh/2021/06/01/here-are-some-of-themajor-hacks-the-us-blamed-on-russia-in-the-last-year/?sh=3beb23e95b9e
12
Id.
13
Simonetta Di Pippo, Space Technology and the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda, UN
CHRONICLE, https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/space-technology-and-implementation-2030agenda (last visited Apr. 21, 2022).
14
Vaibhav Gupta, World’s 1st Satellite was the Size of a Beach Ball, INSHORTS (Oct. 4, 2016),
https://inshorts.com/en/news/worlds-1st-satellite-was-the-size-of-a-beach-ball1475582799404?utm_source=news_share&forward_to_store=true.
15
Sarah Loff, Explorer 1 Overview, NASA (Aug. 3, 2017),
https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/explorer/explorer-overview.html.
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29, 1958, President Eisenhower ushered in the beginning of the National
Aeronautics and Space Act, signing the nation’s space agency into law.16 Since
those days, space exploration has remained a fascination to many in the US and
worldwide, while seeking to understand the unknown and what lies beyond our
solar system.
Since the launch of Sputnik I, the law has been that outer space is free for
exploration and use by all States.17 Article II of the Outer Space Treaty (OTS),
specifically notes that: “[o]uter space, including the Moon and other celestial
bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means
of use or occupation, or by any other means.”18 The first age of space exploration
during the 1960s and 70s was dominated by two nations and guided by the
wisdom of the Outer Space Treaty.19 The age of the Apollo missions was one of
high expectations, and it opened the door for the years of the space shuttle
program.
At present, we are entering the second space age, colloquially known as
‘NewSpace.’20 The concept of NewSpace involves technological, legal,
commercial, and social innovations.21 The result is a “decrease in the expenses
related to the provision of new space products and services, and this, in turn, has
served to widen the market.”22 The widening of the market is reflected in the
emerging sectors of space mining, space tourism, on-orbit servicing, megaconstellations, and spaceflight.23 This new space age is promising yet vulnerable
to the same flaws of the human condition. OTS Article III delineates space
activities within the context of international law, which includes the Charter of the
United Nations.24 And most relevant, Article VI states in part the following:

16

Steven J. Dick, The Birth of NASA, NASA (Mar. 23,
2008), https://www.nasa.gov/exploration/whyweexplore/WhyWe29.html.
17
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. I, Oct. 10, 1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 205
[hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
18
Id. at art. II.
19
See generally id.
20
See Ruvimbo Samanga, NewSpace, IISL SPACE LAW KNOWLEDGE CONSTELLATION (July
2021), https://constellation.iislweb.space/ruvimbo-samanga-newspace/.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS 272
(Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0].
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“States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international
responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried
on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and
for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with
the provisions set forth in the present Treaty. The activities of nongovernmental entities in outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing
supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.”25
The emerging privatization of outer space activities has brought commerce
into a new age of successful space companies that significantly benefit from
governments’ consistent cooperation and support.26 The age of NewSpace
promises historical heights. Carl Sagan once noted that “[t]here is much that
science doesn’t understand, many mysteries still to be resolved. In a Universe of
tens of billions of light-years across and some ten or fifteen billion years old, this
may be the case forever. We are constantly stumbling on new surprises.”27 The
NewSpace stakeholders move forward into a new contested frontier, while the
global community watches with hopes for a better future.
How a nation is held accountable for its space activities is as significant as
its achievements in space exploration. Reaching Mars and beyond is as notable as
when it does not tolerate the use of its territory as a base of operations for illegal
cyber activities. Given the connection between cyberspace and outer space,
Article III of the Outer Space Treaty delineates space cyber operations within the
context of international law.28 In other words, governance of space activities,
including those that utilize cyber means, extend to outer space uses and
exploration.29 These principles help to visualize norms applicable to cyber
operations in support of space activities.
The years since the first moon landing have passed into memory. NASA’s
Apollo program landed twelve American men on the Moon and returned them
safely to Earth in the short span of only five years.30 No other nation has matched
25

Outer Space Treaty, supra note 17, at art. VI.
Omkar Nikam, Opportunities Emerging from “New Space”, SATELLITE MKT. & RSCH.,
http://satellitemarkets.com/news-analysis/opportunities-emerging-new-space (last visited Apr. 21,
2022).
27
CARL SAGAN, THE DEMON-HAUNTED WORLD: SCIENCE AS A CANDLE IN THE DARK 29 (1997).
28
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 24, at 272.
29
Id.
30
DANIEL MORGAN, CONGR. RSCH. SERV., ARTEMIS: NASA’S PROGRAM TO RETURN HUMANS TO
THE MOON (2021).
26
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this extraordinary feat of innovation and ingenuity. The US government has
committed to returning by 2024.31 The story continues with “Artemis: NASA’s
Program to Return Humans to the Moon.”32 Indeed, NASA has expanded its
mission to include taking not just men but also the first woman and first astronaut
of color.33 It is exciting to imagine the possibilities of the three planned Artemis
missions, although only Artemis III will arrange for a crew that will travel around
the Moon.34 Other expeditions will follow.
However, despite calls for peaceful uses, humanity’s access to outer space
will carry the conflicts of the human condition into the heavens. These conflicts
require additional preparation and planning for the industry’s lawyers and chief
information officers (CISOs). Hopefully, twenty years from now, NASA will
celebrate establishing an outpost in the Moon as a tribute to those great souls of
the Apollo missions and those that will follow. But stakeholders must also make
plans that factor into the calculations the threats associated with space systems.
The NewSpace age may be challenged by the simple failings of humanity. The
idea of cybercrime in outer space may be unimaginable but not inconceivable.
Yet, under those conditions, a CISO may discover a threat with significant
consequences for the organization.
The stories that follow consider the intersection of outer space law and
cybersecurity, describing the limitations of implementing international standards.
This article assesses the cyberthreat landscape while offering recommendations.
Part II, The Cruel Sky, considers a historical mystery to better understand the
contradictory world of cyber operations. Along the way it looks at humanity and
its role to play. Part III, New Frontiers in the Expanse, takes a closer look at the
activities on and near Earth. In particular, it assesses the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act (CFAA). Part IV, Reach for the Stars, treks in search of a
recommendation for the safety and future of space exploration.
II.

The Cruel Sky

A new age of space activities promises historical heights. While new
stakeholders move forward into a new contested frontier, the global community
continues to watch with hopes for a better future. Nevertheless, there are political
considerations that need to be considered based on the realities of outer space.

31

Id.
What is Artemis?, NASA (Feb. 28, 2021), https://www.nasa.gov/what-is-artemis.
33
Id.
34
Id.
32
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Indeed, the race to Mars will face cyberattacks and the risks attached to them.35
Additionally, the ethical ramifications of regulating private space activities are a
new challenge and a new opportunity.36 These activities are supposed to protect
the enjoyment and use of outer space. The future will be ripe with opportunities to
further evolve the dimensions of outer space commerce. Still, it will be successful
only if stakeholders work together to redefine the security landscape of space
objects. If humanity eventually manages to survive from its challenging present
and evolves toward a brighter future, it will be because it has achieved an
interstellar status.
In this second space age, governments are no longer at the center of space
activities.37 The industry has opened up to multiple market participants, including
dozens of startups.38 The race to Mars, Titan, and beyond is no longer an
unexpected future event, but is an act of humanity’s future that began a long time
ago and continues to race in full force. In recent years, three missions were
completed traveling 250 million miles toward Mars.39 The United Arab Emirates
arrived in early February 2021, and China shall arrive shortly after to place probes
in orbit around the planet and a rover.40 NASA also landed a new rover called
Perseverance, the first of its kind to carry a helicopter-type drone.41 It is safe to
say that cyberspace is now tied to the activities in outer space or “space-enabled
communication and information services,” which in turn rely on the operation of
satellites.42

35

Emma Ashford, Can the World Avoid War in Cyberspace–and in Space?, FOREIGN POL’Y (July
23, 2021), https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/23/war-cyberspace-space-nso-pegasus-bezos-rocket/.
36
See generally Brandon Dillon, Profitable Risk: The Dangers of Consumer Spaceflight and Space
Tourism, VITERBI CONVERSATIONS ETHICS (Dec. 12, 2020), https://vce.usc.edu/volume-4-issue2/profitable-risk-the-dangers-of-consumer-spaceflight-and-space-tourism/.
37
See Matt Weinzierl & Mehak Sarang, The Commercial Space Age Is Here, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Feb. 12, 2021), https://hbr.org/2021/02/the-commercial-space-age-is-here.
38
Id.
39
Erin Woo, Startups Aim Beyond Earth, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/07/technology/space-start-ups.html.
40
Morgan McFall-Johnsen, 3 spacecraft are set to reach Mars this month, from NASA, China, and
the UAE. Here's what they aim to learn, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 4, 2021),
https://www.businessinsider.com/three-mars-missions-arrive-february-from-nasa-china-uae-20211.
41
Id.
42
David P. Fidler, Cyber Crime in Outer Space: Houston, Do We Have a Problem?, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/blog/cyber-crime-outer-space-houstondo-we-have-problem.
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This commercialization of space highlights potential cybersecurity
concerns, including rapid innovations in software and hardware lifecycles.43
These activities intersect space transportation, tourism, mining, the Moon, and
Mars.44 While Article I of OTS recognizes “the exploration and use of outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies . . . carried out for the benefit
and in the interests of all countries . . . ” stakeholders should be prepared to adopt
cybersecurity best practices and collaborate on improving the implementation of
security strategies.45 The proliferation of cyber operations as an element that
endures during peacetime forces the space industry CISO to consider questions
about what would constitute the most egregious form of a cyberattack. “As of yet,
there is no global consensus about what an act of war carried out by cyber means
would look like, versus acts that would fall below the level of an act of war, and
although still unlawful, would call for different responses under the law.”46
A larger political problem involves the opposite view: States develop
engagement protocols for cyber operations against other governments. “Dominant
actors like the United States and Russia have reopened the possibility of pursuing
weaponization of space to defend their interests and assert dominance.”47 This is
that hazy ambiguity that afflicts the efforts to develop new norms for cyberspace
in a peaceful outer space. If cyberspace is going to be considered a necessary part
of the arsenal of a State much like international waters, then all of humanity
shares a challenge and duty as a sentient species to at least mitigate the damage
that may be caused to human life.
The sea is one of those domains that spur imagination. It invites any
individual to journey into a new world of discovery. A voyage into that great
maritime expanse is one of those enduring adventures with no beginning or end.
One of those voyages began with one intrepid idea. It was in the Canadian Arctic
Archipelago, one of the most desolate places on Earth, where the story begins.48
Here, in 1845, two powerful British ships were dispatched to investigate the route
43

See generally David P. Fidler, The White House Adopts Cybersecurity Policy for Activities in
Outer Space, COUNCIL FOREIGN REL. (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/blog/white-houseadopts-cybersecurity-policy-activities-outer-space.
44
Fidler, supra note 42.
45
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 17 at art. I.
46
Catherine Lotrionte, Reconsidering the Consequences for State-Sponsored Hostile Cyber
Operations Under International Law, 3 CYBER DEF. REV. 73, 73 (2018).
47
P. J. Blount, Peaceful Purposes for the Benefit of All Mankind: The Ethical Foundations of
Space Security, in WAR AND PEACE IN OUTER SPACE: LAW, POLICY AND ETHICS 119, 120
(Cassandra Steer & Matthew Hersch eds., 2021).
48
OWEN BEATTIE & JOHN GEIGER, FROZEN IN TIME: THE FATE OF THE FRANKLIN EXPEDITION 11
(2017).
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known as the Northwest Passage.49 This sailing route promised its explorers a
gateway between the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans across the top of North
America.50 Sir John Franklin and his 129 men aboard the HMS Erebus and HMS
Terror began the audacious journey and vanished without a trace.51 The resolution
of this mystery forced mariners and relevant stakeholders alike to wrestle with the
true nature of technology and its limits.
It is true that these ships were built to be tough and the experienced crews
“had shown that they were exceptionally resilient.”52 While these ships were
powerful, they were made stronger by the retrofits to handle polar expeditions.53
However, tougher defenses were not a guarantee of invulnerability. In contrast
with present challenges, the technical nature of the Internet makes it nearly
impossible to secure and control. Even with innovative technologies, legal
questions arise with the evolution of cyberspace demonstrating a leap in human
ingenuity along with juridical ambiguity. But these factors also represent
unforeseen dangers. While in outer space borders are imperceptible, closer to the
ground, legal challenges stress the threats to well-established legal notions that
raise doubts for those securing satellite communications. This is simply the case
because technology is constantly evolving. Hence, the nature of cyber operations
arise with unresolved technological issues, security needs, and the related
activities at the national and international levels. “An accurate description and
assessment of any social process requires that initial attention be given to
individuals and group participants.”54 In this case, it is helpful to begin by
considering the challenges of North America through the lenses of the US and
Canada.
The cyberthreat landscape does not afford any special privileges to the
stakeholder of space exploration, which might expect that malicious cyber
operations are being governed safely or that these will remain isolated in the land
domain. This assumption of safety or invulnerability would be the beginning of
failure. For the British Admiralty, the extraordinary men selected to lead their
new expedition were the best. Sir John Franklin led the expedition and Francis
49

Niraj Chokshi, The HMS. Terror Sank in the 1840s. See What It Looks Like Now, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/30/science/hms-terror-wreck-franklinexpedition.html?searchResultPosition=1.
50
GILLIAN HUTCHINSON, SIR JOHN FRANKLIN’S EREBUS AND TERROR EXPEDITION: LOST AND
FOUND 41 (2017).
51
Chokshi, supra note 49.
52
HUTCHINSON, supra note 50.
53
Id. at 42.
54
Myres S. McDougal et al., The World Community: A Planetary Social Process, 21 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 807, 811 (1988).
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Crozier was appointed second in command and captain of the HMS Terror.55
James Fitzjames was third in command and senior officer of the HMS Erebus.56
The image of well-prepared sailors navigating difficult waters may be reassuring
for those relying on the outcome of the mission. In the same manner, IT
professionals must know that cyberattacks will happen because that is the new
nature of cyberspace. Yet, it seems that any network system could potentially be
hacked and for that reason, nothing matches preparation. It is fascinating and
worrisome to see hackers easily defeat the security of a top tech giants.
The future space traveler will face threats indigenous to the cyber realm,
in part, because the present state of affairs in the world is perilous. The United
States is now under daily cyberattacks.57 For the US, being the target of seven
major cyberattacks during 2021 is worrisome.58 Yet, the U.S. has likely faced
many more attacks.59 The Russian government and lone criminals based in Russia
have been blamed for the seven major attacks on the US during 2021.60 For
example, the meat processor JBS was hacked via a ransomware attack, and
hackers tried to use the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID)
email system to send phishing emails.61 The Colonial Pipeline attack was
particularly malicious, with a shut down due to a ramson attack.62 Another attack
involved hackers breaching several U.S. government agencies and companies by
exploiting software made by SolarWinds, and have included other targets such as
state and local governments, hospitals, and COVID-19 vaccine researchers.63
These examples demonstrate that dangerous cyber operations often involve
foreign governments.64 The mystery that arises is the added enigma associated
with nations that knowingly tolerate the use of their territory as bases of illegal
cyber operations to strike other governments and their businesses.65

55

Wrecks of HMS Erebus and HMS Terror National Historic Site, PARKS CAN. (May 27, 2019),
https://www.pc.gc.ca/en/lhn-nhs/nu/epaveswrecks/culture/histoire-history/qui-who.
56
Id.
57
See generally Nicole Perlroth, How the United States Lost to Hackers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/06/technology/cyber-hackers-usa.html.
58
Walsh, supra note 11.
59
See TOURO COLL. ILL., supra note 8.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Christopher Wray, Worldwide Threats to the Homeland: 20 Years After 9/11, FBI (Sept. 22,
2021), https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/worldwide-threats-to-the-homeland-20-years-after911-wray-092221.
65
See, e.g., Cyber Operations Tracker, COUNCIL FOREIGN REL., https://www.cfr.org/cyberoperations/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2022).
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Finding a solution to the cyberattacks that harass national infrastructures
appears to be as elusive as the Northwest Passage.66 But a solution is necessary
for the success of this new age of exploration. “If a theory about international law
is to be helpful, it must, of course, show how to identify the legal process in terms
that enable the scientific observer or the active participant to isolate it for separate
consideration.”67 Michel Bourély, a legal scholar, once noted, as to humanity’s
activities in space, that from the beginning “the international community was
conscious of the need to organize [those activities] by adopting, as early as
possible, a means of regulation.”68 Now humanity finds itself facing the need to
organize cyber activities by adopting new standards or norms of behavior.69 If
cybersecurity experts and relevant stakeholders are to extend satellite services into
deep space and beyond, then it is expected that better cooperation will exist in the
space industry. Bourély adds that “[s]cholars as well as decision makers need to
develop a comprehensive, yet convenient and economic, method that permits
them to make adequate particular reference to the global community process in
order to discharge effectively the intellectual tasks of inquiry and decision.”70
While space regulation materialized fairly quickly in the form of the Outer Space
Treaty, in the cyber realm, this formalized evolution has been slow to change.71
The problem is a symptomatic representation of historical developments that tied
cyberspace to notions of control and cyberpower.72 “By taking advantage of
ambiguities in the law [some States] can sow doubt in the lawfulness of
[defensive] responses, eliminating, limiting or delaying responses.”73 Cyber
operations that support space activities represent various services, but no other
potential military objectives. So, any use of force could trigger national liability
and responsibility considerations, via Articles VI and VII of the Outer Space
treaty.74
The US Joint Chiefs of Staff define the concept of a cyber operation as
“the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to
66

See Daniel Wagner, The Growing Threat of Cyber-Attacks on Critical Infrastructure, IRMI,
(June 2016), https://www.irmi.com/articles/expert-commentary/cyber-attack-criticalinfrastructure.
67
McDougal et al., supra note 54, at 811.
68
Michel Bourély, Space Commercialization and the Law, 4 SPACE POL’Y 131, 132 (1988).
69
See id.
70
McDougal, et al., supra note 54, at 813.
71
André Barrinha, Could Cyber-Diplomacy Learn from Outer Space, DIRECTIONS (Apr. 30, 2021)
https://directionsblog.eu/could-cyber-diplomacy-learn-from-outer-space/.
72
See Daniel T. Kuehl, From Cyberspace to Cyberpower: Defining the Problem, in CYBER POWER
AND NATIONAL SECURITY, (Franklin D. Kramer et al. eds., 2009).
73
Lotrionte, supra note 46, at 74.
74
Sarah M. Mountin, The Legality and Implications of Intentional Interference with Commercial
Communication Satellite Signals, 90 INTL. L. STUD. 101, 143–145, 148, 179 (2014).
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achieve objectives in or through cyberspace.”75 Another approach to the same
concept notes that it is also defined as the “planning and synchronization of
activities in and through cyberspace to enable freedom of [maneuver] and to
achieve military objectives.”76 These capabilities, for example, may involve
“computers, software tools, or networks.”77
The problem of security is not isolated to a particular industry or a
particular nation. The risks are many and spread across all industry sectors. For
example, Canada has faced severe difficulties in the cyber landscape similar to
those experienced by the United States. For example, in 2018, “Canada’s fourth
and fifth largest bank confirmed that ‘fraudsters’ stole the personal and financial
information of some of the banks’ customers.”78 The Bank of Montreal and the
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce’s Simplii Financial acknowledged the loss
of personally identifiable information.79 The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
notes that “[c]yber threat actors are states, groups, or individuals who, with
malicious intent, aim to take advantage of vulnerabilities, low cyber security
awareness, or technological developments to gain unauthorized access to
information systems in order to access or otherwise affect victims’ data, devices,
systems, and networks.”80 For example, Canada Post, the counterpart to the US
Postal Service, fell victim to a cyber intrusion that lasted for years, although it
was not reported until recently.81 “The information affected is from July 2016 to
March 2019, and 97 percent of it comprised the names and addresses of receiving
customers.”82 In this case, the Canada Post vulnerability, similar to the US Target
case, originated with a third party and was “a supply chain attack that allowed
hackers to capture the names and addresses of almost one million senders and
receivers of packages over a three-year period.”83 The direct target was
75
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Commport Communications, which supplied the Post with the electronic data
interchange (EDI) solution that “manages the shipping manifest data of large
parcel business customers.”84 In the US, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency (CISA) manages similar threats and collaborates with partners to
secure the infrastructure.85 CISA ensures that the systems, networks and critical
infrastructure remain reliable “to better prepare for, respond to, and recover from
natural or man-made disasters.”86 Now both nation collaborate as one unit with
two nations reflected in the “Cybersecurity Action Plan,” drafted to strengthen
and integrate the cyber activities of the Department of Homeland Security and
Public Safety Canada.87
The days before Terror and Erebus set sail were filled with social
engagements and a general sense of excitement.88 Without a doubt, “[n]o Arctic
expedition had ever been so lavishly outfitted.”89 A lot has been discussed and
written about governments’ responsibility concerning their activities in all
domains of human activity.90 Yet, the conflicts in cyberspace are now a daily
occurrence.91 Another example, the Russian sponsored APT29 group, “also
known as Cozy Bears,” targeted British, American, and Canadian organizations to
acquire secrets associated with developing the COVID-19 vaccine.92 Disasters can
be avoided if awareness accompanies the implementation of a plan guided by
standards developed by the cybersecurity community. The specter of
unanticipated vulnerabilities forces an honest examination of national policies.
The worst possible scenario is one fueled by overconfident expectations. “Captain
Sir John Franklin’s two-ship expedition of 1845 was confidently expected to be
the first to traverse the archipelago all the way from Baffin Bay to Bering Strait,
linking the Atlantic and Pacific oceans by a Northwest Passage.”93
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Unquestionably, the most remarkable threat is the numerous and complex
cyberattacks that plague users’ daily lives. These cyberattacks stand for
opportunities of increased confusion and fear. The US and its allies most
modernize and stay technologically ahead to maintain the needed superiority
along with their national security. “The US stands alone as the only tier-one cyber
power in the world, but China will rise as a highly capable peer competitor over
the next decade, a new International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) report
concludes.”94 The problem with a future cyberwar would be one of disruption and
chaos. Defining new law for cyberspace, however, is currently unachievable.95 A
recent “report notes that China has evolved its cyber capabilities from ‘a position
of relative electronics backwardness’ three decades ago to ‘conduct[ing] largescale cyber operations abroad, aiming to acquire intellectual property, achieve
political influence, carry out state-on-state espionage and position capabilities for
disruptive effect in case of future conflict.’”96
While a binding international cyber law may seem lost like the Erebus, the
recent evolving norms seem to represent a hopeful opportunity.97 Yet, the cyberhorizons that need navigating offer greater obstacles in outer space. On January
11, 2007, China launched an anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) into space to destroy
its own FY-1 weather satellite located in low Earth orbit.98 This intentional
destruction of the Chinese weather satellite created a serious mess of debris in
orbit, adding 300,000 new pieces of trash to the current debris problem around the
planet.99 The Chinese ASAT test caused global commotion and represented a sign
that China had grown military capabilities in space.100 Then there is China’s
willingness to hack US space assets, including “satellite operators, defense
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contractors and telecommunications companies.”101 The case of Russia is equally
troubling. On April 15, 2020, Russia conducted another ASAT test utilizing its
Nudol interceptor.102 Russia’s cutting-edge spying tools now enables them to do
much more in the form of cyberattacks.103 Thoughts about the methods applied in
space and their relations with information assurance bring the discussion in full
circle to the human condition and those innate imperfections found in every
human being. Erebus and Terror disappeared somewhere along their voyage,
“seemingly swallowed by the ice and never heard from again, at least not from the
explorers themselves.”104 The truth behind the ill-fated Arctic expedition seemed
to disappear with the icy waters of the north.
III.

The Human Condition

The Human condition could simply be understood as the participation of
the human being in outer space activities.105 The meaning of this idea has many
ramifications and consequences. While space activities invite thoughts of
cooperation and good will, these will not be omnipresent in those activities. As
humanity moves into the space frontier, the activities of exploration and
colonization will require the guidance provided by the rule of law. “The most
intense strain on any concept of the rule of law is exercised in times of crisis.”106
It could be said that the need to colonize our solar system will be fuel by need
more than curiosity. Then again, as new ways of militarization in outer space are
developed, the shadow of conflict rises in the horizon of the human mind. “It has
been argued that, especially in times of war and similar emergencies, the law
recedes or even vanishes (inter armas silent leges).”107 If this is the case, where
would space law stand? Michael Bourély anticipated that these activities
“responded to the idea that the new technologies being developed could
101
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contribute to the moral and material progress of all the world’s peoples.”108
Indeed, the space industry has the capabilities of pushing the boundaries to
unexpected moral quandaries in the far reaches of outer space. The moral
quandaries, or ethics of outer space, suggest the need for a new template of
binding norms of cybersecurity in outer space.109 If cyber norms are not
applicable to all relevant situations, then what is the future of State-sponsored
cyber operations? It is within this ambiguity that the spirit of the law conflicts
with the letter of the law.110 The modern landscape of outer space activities is one
where “power allocation in space has changed a great deal as plethora of
commercial actors have entered the domain, and a number of new State actors are
asserting themselves, such as China and India.”111 The CEO, the military
commanders, and relevant stakeholders must be cognizant of the ambiguity,
which is more troublesome within the landscape of external and internal threats,
their highest probability of occurrence and significant loss.112 For example, the
Ministry of State Security of China is one actor to be noted. “A federal grand jury
in Spokane, Washington, returned an indictment . . . charging two hackers, both
nationals and residents of the People’s Republic of China, with hacking into the
computer systems of hundreds of victim companies in the United States and
abroad . . . ”113 The hackers stole terabytes of data, including data from medical
device manufacturers.114
There is almost a sense of nostalgia of more inspiring times when men
walked on the Moon. It was then, on December 7, 1972 that the final mission,
Apollo 17, launched a Saturn V rocket from Kennedy Space Center traveling to
the Moon and landing in the southeastern rim of Mare Serenitatis.115 This mission
transported the 11th and 12th astronauts to the surface of the Moon, and it was the
first mission to include a scientist – a geologist – becoming the last voyage of its
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kind till today.116 Almost fifty years later the lunar missions are seeing new life
with the upcoming project named after the sister of Apollo: Artemis.117 It is a new
beginning or perhaps a continuation of the explorations from the age of empires.
The British government began seeking routes to the Pacific north of
Eurasia in 1818.118 The expeditions of the Royal Navy “into the North American
Arctic pushed back the margin of the terra incognita, until the existence of one or
more waterways through the islands north of the continental mainland seemed
beyond doubt.”119 “At sea in the Arctic, it’s easy to lose sight of where you
are.”120 In the same way, a voyage of discovery in the High Arctic in late summer
offers an environment “between the final melt and the next full freeze. Like
clouds parting after a storm, the sea [cracks and drifts].”121 In truth, the British
chose the names of their ships to instill fear in the enemy during this
unprecedented period of exploration and international interaction.122 The same
could be said of the enigmatic names utilized by the hacker groups and their
destructive malware. Gillian Hutchinson, curator at the National Maritime
Museum in London, noted that the ship name ‘Erebus’ means “the darkness at the
entrance to Hell.”123 For these ships, a journey into the darkness was about to
begin. “The departure of Erebus and Terror to search for the North-West Passage
was a major news story in Britain.”124 This journey serves as a reminder that there
is a price to pay for space exploration and it is intertwined with the utilization of
cyberspace. The law of cyber operations managed by the international community
remains unresolved and in need of further clarification.125 Space law expert Bin
Cheng, explained:126
In principle, even within a State’s own territory, the
State is not directly responsible for injuries caused to
foreign States or their nationals by the acts of private
116
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persons, whether nationals or non-nationals, and
whatever their number, from single individuals
through mobs and rioters to whole revolutionary
forces for as long as they remain unsuccessful
revolutionaries.
The question that must follow should be: how will the CISOs know if a
“private actor” is truly out of the purview of the State? As Rainn Ottis writes,
“[o]ne of the biggest lessons [that emerged from the notorious 2007 Estonia
cyberattack] is that in a modern “conflict, cyber-attacks [have become]
increasingly more common and dangerous.127 Any country with sufficiently welldeveloped network infrastructure is vulnerable to these attacks.”128 The overall
national risk cannot be mitigated if it is not known or anticipated.129 If we
deconstruct this ethical ambiguity we uncover a much-needed rule of law
applicable to cyberspace in outer space. It is this law that may offer the potential
source of substantive justice, equality, and accountability.
The hopes and desires of the future are based on the belief that outer space
is a realm of peaceful exploration and use. This applies to cyber operations that
enhance space activities. It is of concern to assert that freedom of use to benefit
humanity could become in danger with contested activities. However, space data
poses new challenges for CISOs and other stakeholders. Indeed, the new race for
the Moon and the subsequent race to Mars will face new cyberthreats, and risks
will follow. Yet, these threats are antithetical to the enjoyment of human activities
in space. The dark side of innovation raises many questions, but few answers are
available. While most agree that international law applies in cyberspace, experts
still wrestle with the universal consensus of how that law will be applied.130
According to Anders Henriksen, "[i]n an anarchical cyberspace without ’rules of
the road‘ and shared expectations of behavior, stronger states will be free to
impose their will on weaker states and minor incidents may escalate and spin out
of control.”131 For example, NASA is currently relying on potentially developing
nuclear thermal propulsion (NTP) engine that would heat up liquid hydrogen to
127
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generate the required thrust.132 These and other projects are promising as long as
security is considered in the planning and subsequent processes.
The second age of exploration requires a move to modernize and stay
technologically ahead. It is also necessary to keep a high level of awareness to
maintain the superiority of national security. It is worrisome to note the frequency
and severity of hacks. It is now a race that gains terrain with time, and time is a
luxury that States lack. Captain Francis Crozier understood the dangers associated
with overestimating dangerous conditions as noted in the story of Terror: “I
suggest that we reverse course, avoid the pack ice to the southwest, and sail east
and then south down the eastern coast of what may well be King William Island.
At the very least, we will be sheltered . . . ”133 Unfortunately, the captain’s
suggestion was not put into action and the actual and final decision brought a
certain doom to the crews. Over a dozen year period the British Admiralty
dispatched a series of search expeditions, including private interests in both
Britain and the United States.134 But what will be the cost of space exploration if
the gap between nations is filled with warfare? The world is now plagued with
rising tensions that could ravage the globe as situations escalate into a conflict of
military activities in outer space.135 And, while the satellite industry predates the
age of the Internet, which kept the space systems safe, satellites are now a
component of the worldwide communications infrastructure that transfers data via
cable and fiber.136 These data transfers such as atmospheric imagery, television,
navigation, and others provides redundancies since “satellite communications
serve as a back-up to landlines.”137 While hacks of one of these systems could
produce a simple shutdown, it could also give way to multiple catastrophic
scenarios, including the jamming of signals to create confusion for operators of
critical infrastructures.138 Another scenario may entail a hacker manipulating the
satellite’s thrusters to crash it into another satellite, or even causing it to collide
with the International Space Station.139 In this new reality, organizations need to
132
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be more accepting of the idea that their business could be the next casualty of
war.140 Then again, information becomes that tool that makes all the difference.
As the industry develops new technologies and begins to expand its horizons, it
will be critical that organizations assess how cybersecurity awareness is
incorporated into their future agendas.
Modern space activities have evolved for a new frontier that promises
investors riches beyond the borders of the atmosphere.141 Our modern age of
communications offers new worlds within our own development and
understanding. Consider that the Earth is about 238,855 miles away from the
Moon.142 Now consider the potential for a crime committed in outer space and the
possibility that the Internet plays a part. Imagine if an astronaut receives terrible
news from home, and in desperation, this otherwise intelligent individual accesses
a bank account without permission, emptying the account in the process. The
Space Force constable assigned a tour of duty to the space station may have to
investigate such a novel case. The constable may discover that emails received by
the astronaut from home were at the center of a divorce dispute. How would this
crime be handled? Solutions will be needed to resolve new challenges arising out
of private cyber activities during outer space activities. As human activities
diversify in space, the relevant stakeholders will have to consider the expansion of
what it means to participate in space activities. Visions of new worlds mingle with
the lessons of the past. The borderless nature of cyberspace has turned outer space
into a domain of uncertainty plagued by surreptitious activities. Yet, nations have
a vested interest in protecting their space-based systems. These systems begin to
operate in land and continue transmission in outer space. As nations seek ways to
protect their national critical infrastructure sectors, the space industry community
wrestles with challenges associated with innate vulnerabilities. However, not even
the experienced mariners of the British Empire could have anticipated the horrors
to be faced in the final months of their lives. “On July 9, 1845, two months after
departing from Greenhithe, England, Warrant Officer John Gregory wrote a letter
to his wife from Greenland in which he described seeing whales and icebergs for
the first time,”143 How then did this perfectly equipped and prepared expedition
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end in disaster?144 What transpired in the last days of the mission? “Gregory, who
had never been to sea before, was aboard the H.M.S. Erebus,” which came to be
“stuck in ice in Victoria Strait, off King William Island in what is now the
Canadian territory of Nunavut.”145
IV.

Reach for the Stars: Recommendations

Today, information-driven organizations offer services in an intriguing
time of emerging outer space ventures. These ventures are unavoidably
intertwined with cyber operations. The idea that a cyber operation is always an
external threat is inaccurate. NASA’ missions must factor security vulnerabilities
and, at the same time, apply needed controls to counter potential issues.146 NASA
must also consider human behavior. To provide an example, a divorce sometimes
takes perfectly reasonable individuals into a world of confused emotions. This is
the real case of Summer Worden (a United States Air Force intelligence officer)
and Anne McClain (a United States astronaut).147 The case seemed simple
enough: “Summer Worden ... [was] in the midst of a bitter separation and
parenting dispute ... [and] was surprised when she noticed that her estranged
spouse still seemed to know things about her spending. Had she bought a car?
How could she afford that?”148 By using her intelligence background and
inquiring with the bank, Worden realized that her bank account had been accessed
with her login credentials from outer space.149 . Could this be the first case in
outer space where the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) was applicable? In
other words, did Anne McClain have permission to access the information in
question? For the space constable, this case investigates, clarifies, and offers a
normative approach for the benefit of potential new and complicated cases in the
space domain.
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a.

Recommendation #1: The CFAA

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) of 1986 was drafted to
criminalize computer crimes outside the scope of existing mail and wire fraud
statutes, and originally covered unauthorized access of “federal interest”
computers.150 Yet, given its interstate reach, “it effectively criminalized any
unauthorized computer access,” and its reach expanded further in 1996 when
amendments substituted the language “federal interest computer” with “protected
computer.”151 The statute reads:152
(a) Whoever...
(2) intentionally accesses a computer without
authorization or exceeds authorized access, and
thereby obtains(A) information contained in a financial
record of a financial institution . . .
In the case at hand, “Ms. Worden’s spouse, [astronaut] Anne McClain,
was a decorated NASA astronaut on a six-month mission aboard the International
Space Station.”153 Astronaut McClain admitted to accessing the bank account
from outer space.154 Yet, these facts alone do not solve the case. As noted by a
commentator from the Council of Foreign Relations, this situation raises the
larger question of “whether the United States [had] criminal jurisdiction over the
astronaut in question and what criminal law applies to U.S. nationals in space.”155
The case centered on using the space station to connect with a terrestrial computer
system, with possible criminal intent, thus entering the CFAA scope.156 Ms.
Worden “filed a complaint with the Federal Trade Commission and her family
lodged one with NASA’s Office of Inspector General, accusing Ms. McClain of
identity theft and improper access to Ms. Worden’s private financial records.”157
How might this case be resolved? The CFAA, as noted earlier, states that one
cannot “intentionally access a computer without authorization or exceed
150
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authorized access, and thereby obtain . . . information contained in a financial
record of a financial institution . . . ” Could the CFAA apply in outer space, and
how would it apply to this case? The answer requires a closer look at the pertinent
US law, treaty law, and a presidential directive.
The international law of outer space is guided by five treaties.158 The main
treaty, known colloquially as the Outer Space Treaty, is the most pertinent.159
This treaty, ratified by the US, sets the stage for the law of outer space, yet does
not provide a legal remedy for the criminal activity referenced in the case at
hand.160 “The law of outer space has developed as a discrete body of law within
general public international law. Since the launch of Sputnik 1 in 1957, this
process of evolution has been remarkably rapid, largely driven by the need to
agree on rules to regulate activities in this new ‘frontier.’”161 A direct examination
of the OST provides guidance in this particular case. This agreement, as noted
earlier, declares, “Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies,
shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any
kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there
shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.”162 This freedom to explore
permits the activities of NASA in outer space as the space agency of the US
government but does not provide direct guidance regarding a potential crime
carried out by an astronaut in outer space. OST Article VI states in relevant part
that “States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national
activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies . . . ” and
OST Article VIII notes that “[a] State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an
object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control
over such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a
celestial body.”163 As no other provisions of the space treaties address crime
directly, other factors would prove useful for our constable.
The Internet was designed to be a free-flowing avenue of data
transmission.164 This network of networks was “conceived [as] a level playing
158
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field for different networks and protocols, with no sense that the same openness
could enable a new kind of monopoly power. Most painfully, this new network
was imagined as a forum for the free exchange of ideas, with no sense of how
predatory and oppressive that exchange would become.”165 Indeed, that founding
ideal began to collapse in 1988, when Robert Tappan Morris accidentally released
the first malicious worm on the Internet, shutting down about ten percent of
internet-connected computers.166 The same idealism had echoed in the thoughts of
the brave crews of the Erebus and Terror, who were “well on their way, nearing
Iceland, when [the captain] reveled in the sight of porpoises, bounding out of the
waves at the ships’ bows, and a sea bird similar to a petrel.”167 However, for those
British explorers, the unidentifiable nature of potential danger predicted disaster.
Our constable, on the other hand, must first be aware of the nature of
cyber operations. “The sheer pace of change and the broadening of potential
activities in outer space dictates that we need to continually monitor the scope and
content of this framework, whilst at the same time recognizing that, at least from a
strictly legal regulatory perspective, it will not (ever) be possible for the law to
keep up with these changes.”168 Indeed, our marshal must gather all the tools
available to understand this landscape. A legal parallel would be the next
reasonable step. “Generally speaking, a parallel may be drawn between crimes
committed on board an aircraft flying over the high seas or a ship on the high
seas, and crimes perpetrated within the confines of a spacecraft.”169 If the state of
registry or flag can determine jurisdiction over aircraft personnel, then in outer
space, OST Article VIII determines jurisdiction over spacecraft personnel based
on the launching party.170 In this case, that space object is the International Space
Station.
The International Space Station Agreement (or ISS Agreement) is the
legal guidebook for activities related to the space station.171 Article 5 notes in part
that “each Partner shall retain jurisdiction and control . . . over personnel in or on
the Space Station who are its nationals.”172 Article 22 of the agreement addresses
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criminal jurisdiction.173 Subsection (1) states in relevant part that “the United
States may exercise criminal jurisdiction over personnel in or on any flight
element who are their respective nationals.” The agreement “uses the criminal law
of the state of the nationality of individual astronauts.”174 In this manner, Article
22 provides the US with the power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over US
personnel in the ISS. But the actual exercise of this jurisdiction requires an
additional extraterritorial element. Federal law as delineated in 18 U.S. Code §
3238, states:175
The trial of all offenses begun or committed upon the
high seas, or elsewhere out of the jurisdiction of any
particular State or district, shall be in the district in
which the offender, or any one of two or more joint
offenders, is arrested or is first brought; but if such
offender or offenders are not so arrested or brought
into any district, an indictment or information may
be filed in the district of the last known residence of
the offender or of any one of two or more joint
offenders, or if no such residence is known the
indictment or information may be filed in the District
of Columbia.
This statute, in combination with the ISS Agreement Articles 5 and 22,
offers our station constable and his colleague prosecutor an opportunity to tackle
this case. The next step would be to explore how the development of new
technologies interacts with US law. Specifically, “[i]t is important to recognize
that the important issues that arise from the continuing development of cyber
technology are increasingly relevant for the regulation of outer space, given the
increasing rush towards a ‘digitization’ of space activities.”176 This recognition
triggers the next legal inquiry that brings our astronaut under US terrestrial
control. The provisions of US federal law, Special Maritime and Territorial
Jurisdiction of the United States, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 7(6) state:177
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The term ‘special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States’, as used in this title,
includes:
(6) Any vehicle used or designed for flight or
navigation in space and on the registry of the United
States pursuant to the Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies and the Convention on
Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space,
while that vehicle is in flight . . .
Indeed, there is little literature about this section of the law and has
remained mainly unused except for a few aviation cases. This statute which is
now very relevant seems to have escaped the attention of mainstream scholars that
have concentrated their attention exclusively in the ISS Agreement and the Outer
Space Treaty.178 US law involves one final provision, that as of now, has not been
changed or updated. A legacy of the Trump administration’s, “Memorandum on
Space Policy Directive-5—Cybersecurity Principles for Space Systems”
delineates the cybersecurity policy for space systems.179 Section 3 states that
“[c]ybersecurity principles and practices that apply to terrestrial systems also
apply to space systems . . . Effective cybersecurity practices arise out of cultures
of prevention, active defense, risk management, and sharing best practices.”180
While the U.S. government has gone through a change in federal administration,
“one thing that most experts say will stay the same in principle is Space Policy
Directive 5.”181 Our constable and prosecutor, having demonstrated the interests
of the U.S. government in protecting its communication network in outer space
and having delineated the jurisdictional parameters, return to the CFAA. The
CFAA brings significant factors together in finding jurisdiction.182 In United
States v. Ivanov, the court was analyzing an earlier cyber-ransom case involving
the breach of computers belonging to an e-commerce company known as the
Online Information Bureau (OIB).183 The court’s reasoning is applicable to a case
178
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in outer space. In Ivanov, the court explained that regarding “subject matter
jurisdiction over each of the charges against Ivanov, whether or not” the relevant
statutes for the substantive offenses were “intended by Congress to apply
extraterritorially, because the intended and actual detrimental effects of the
substantive offenses . . . occurred within the United States” there was
jurisdiction.184
The case of Anne McClain, it has been suggested, involves the CFAA’s
applicability to U.S. astronauts engaged in space activities.185 First, these
activities involved cyberspace. Second, Node #2 of the International Space
Station, includes a U.S. “On-orbit Segment” that houses the quarters of four
astronauts, which among other things, “provides a personal, private location for
crew members to sleep, relax . . . call home . . . [and is] designed with . . . laptop
connections, and internet connection to allow crew members personal
communication with family and friends.”186 In LVRC Holdings, LLC v. Brekka,
the employee accessed the employer’s computer system without his knowledge or
permission.187 The question was whether an employee needed permission to
access the organization’s computers.188 The court explained that “a person who
‘exceeds authorized access,’ has permission to access the computer, but [ends up
accessing] information on the computer that the person is not entitled to
access.”189 The Brekka court noted in relevant part that “§ 1030 is primarily a
criminal statute, and §§ 1030(a)(2) and (4) create criminal liability for violators of
the statute. Although this case arises in a civil context, our interpretation of §§
1030(a)(2) and (4) is equally applicable in the criminal context . . . The Supreme
Court has long warned against interpreting criminal statutes in surprising and
novel ways that impose unexpected burdens on defendants.”190 The challenge
here is the location of outer space. Could US law be extended beyond national
boundaries? “The Constitution grants Congress broad powers to enact laws with
extraterritorial scope . . . [and] provides criminal and civil remedies resulting from
unauthorized access to computers used in interstate commerce or
communications. And, it further provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction for
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criminal or civil violations of the CFAA.”191 Could questions about the
presumption against extraterritoriality arise given the location and involvement of
astronauts of other nations? It is likely that the CFAA will be applicable in
Cislunar space.
In the end, NASA must take into consideration the human factor. In the
case at hand, Anne McClain insisted that she was merely shepherding the
couple’s still-intertwined finances.192 Assuming all things being equal, the §
1030(a)(2) test was not met since her access was still authorized.193 Yet, the
question of the CFAA’s applicability in outer space has not been fully assessed—
and definitely—hardly tackled by the US governments or the courts. Anne
McClain was eventually cleared of all charges. “U.S. Attorney Ryan Patrick from
the United State Attorney’s Office in the Southern District of Texas, [announced
that] Worden [had] been charged with lying about the alleged offense.”194 Ms.
McClain, on the other hand, was selected for the Artemis mission.195 One
fundamental lesson from this case is best stated as a question: what can the U.S.
government do to prepare for the next crisis? Astronauts will carry their human
failings to the Moon, Mars, and beyond. A federal court sooner or later must
decide the applicability of the CFAA to a case in outer space. The answer to the
protection of communications in outer space is tied to the modernization of the
191
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statute. Congress must amend the CFAA once more to account for cyber activities
and to fall in harmony with the Outer Space Treaty. However, “[l]aw does not
arise automatically from technical necessities as perceived by an orderly mind. It
is not a static body of rules enshrined in treaties, statutes, and textbooks.”196 As
time passes and technologies evolve, it is reasonable to deduce that the law will
need further amendments, while courts struggle to keep up. But then again, that is
precisely the function of law. “Law is a continuing process of interaction in
which, at the global level, decision-makers of individual territorial communities
unilaterally put forward claims such as those relating to” cyber operations.197 If
we cannot evolve over time, confusion will compromise our nation’s security,
commercial organizations, and the trust of the consumers. In this day and age, our
data is the most valuable commodity. Yet, at the moment, its protection is in
doubt.
b.

Recommendation #2: The Outer Space Treaty in Spirit

The outer space industry must be understood as more than a new frontier
of exploration. It is a challenging and dangerous domain for the human species.
The new space traveler is in harm’s way when exploring the unknown simply
because humanity must return to outer space. It is a new environment capable of
supporting space activities and unimaginable challenges. It is threats raised now
that concern the attention of security professionals. Experts can only wonder
about the emerging threats that may arise from outer space. Indeed, it would be
highly beneficial if the industry adopted a formalized process, which began with
the Outer Space Treaty. A world united in peace is a better world. There is an
overwhelming agreement about this particular statement.198 In the ambit of outer
space, this is amplified by the principles enshrined in the Outer Stace Treaty.199
“The legal principles of current international space law, especially the Outer
Space Treaty, recognize the inclusive interest of the international community —
that is, the global public interest — in outer space by assuring all States the right
of free access to outer space without discrimination of any kind.”200 Yet, there
seems to be equally hidden forces at work that seek to overturn years of progress.
Nowhere this is more obvious than in cyberspace. As the industry develops new
196
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technologies and begins to expand its horizons, it will be critical that
organizations assess how cybersecurity awareness is incorporated into the
agendas of executives and staff, given that it can affect the success or failure of
any company.201 Fortunately, the Outer Space Treaty was drafted as a visionary
document: “Desiring to contribute to international cooperation in the scientific
and the legal aspects of the exploration and use of outer space, those who drafted
the Outer Space Treaty intentionally kept its scope broad enough to govern all
future space activities.”202
Executives, military commanders, CISOs, and other relevant stakeholders
must engage security issues with awareness, education, and training. The threats
to organizational assets could be a form of meddling into a satellite or loss of data
being transmitted by a satellite.203 Legacy satellite platforms add another layer of
threats with inconsistent software patching, weak encryption, and old
equipment.204 Furthermore, the space environment is also susceptible to human
errors and the supply chain.205 For example, some satellites components are
manufactured outside the U.S., and “vulnerabilities can be built in by threat
actors.”206 As stakeholders continue to learn new exploration methods, cyberspace
has emerged as part of that frontier, where mysteries indigenous to the cyber
realm begin to occupy those exploring outer space. However, a template for
general rules of application relies of the nonbinding nature of norms of behavior
designated by those who draft them. In contrast, “[t]he Outer Space Treaty is not a
collection of idealistic goals without legal implications. The intention of the
authors of the Treaty was clearly to create binding obligations. The Treaty’s
principles must be interpreted as legally authoritative norms that govern
international relations in all matters relating to outer space.”207 The same should
be said of international cyber norms.
The nature of these norms have been addressed multiple times by the
United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE) on Developments in
the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International
201
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Security.208 Their work has been reflected in the General Assembly Resolutions
65/41 (adopted 8 December 2010), 68/243 (adopted 27 December 2013), and
70/174 (adopted 17 December 2015).209 The 2018 United Nations’s Open-ended
Working Group (OEWG) on developments in the field of information and
telecommunications in the context of international security worked on similar
issues as the GGE.210 The OEWG final report observed that the [GGE]
“recommended 11 voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible State behaviour
and recognized that additional norms could be developed over time.”211 Later, the
2019-2020 UN GGE delineated critical observations, among them:
•

“The measures recommended by previous GGEs
and the OEWG represent an initial framework for
responsible State behavior in the use of ICTs. As
further guidance, and to facilitate such
cooperation, the Group recommends that States
put in place or strengthen existing mechanisms,
structures and procedures at the national level
such as relevant policy, legislation and
corresponding review processes; mechanisms for
crisis and incident management . . . ”212

•

“An affected State’s response to malicious ICT
activity attributable to another State should be in
accordance with its obligations under the Charter
of the United Nations and other international law
. . . ”213

•

“With regard to this norm, ICT activity that
intentionally damages critical infrastructure or
otherwise impairs the use and operation of
critical infrastructure to provide services to the
public can have cascading domestic, regional and
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global effects. It poses an elevated risk of harm
to the population, and can be escalatory, possibly
leading to conflict.”214
While the discussions and work produced have merit, it is not
enough in the ambit of cyber operations. In the future, the work of GGE
and OEWG may become binding international law. But, at present, it is
not useful at a time when it is needed most. While some nations “give lip
service to the need to keep space secure, none seems to be willing to truly
engage in substantive talks on maintaining multilateral space security and,
instead, opt to entrench themselves within their own national interests.”215
Stakeholders from the cyber and space domains suffer from a lack of will.
Cybersecurity threats and cyberattacks will overshadow the daily activities
of governments and corporations if corrective action is not taken.
“Interestingly, it is these same [nations] that [will] have the most to lose if
there is an escalation to conflict in the space environment.”216 Moreover,
the present state of the cybersecurity culture of the satellite industry is
worrisome. A complete failure of outer space-critical infrastructure
systems during an emergency would be disastrous. The question of the
security of the critical infrastructure systems for the space industry has not
been fully assessed—and possibly—hardly assessed by governments or
the commercial sector. Assuring the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of information is critically important. It all begins with the
nature of the data and what it means to humanity. A shift towards greater
cooperation and harmonization of policies among various stakeholders in
the cyber ecosystem will be beneficial. The GGE and OEWG are only the
beginning. As nations seek ways to protect their critical national
infrastructure, the space industry will grapple with extraordinary
challenges associated with common vulnerabilities exploited by malicious
online attacks. In order to apply international cyber law to space activities,
Article III of the Outer Space Treaty must highlight cyber activities in
outer space. The applicability of Article III rests in its language:217
“States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities
in the exploration and use of outer space, including
the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance
with international law, including the Charter of the
214
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United Nations, in the interest of maintaining
international peace and security and promoting
international co- operation and understanding.”
In this manner, Article III provides a bridge between international law and
its protections. “The freedom of use of outer space does not include its ‘misuse’
or ‘abuse.’ Under international law, the concept of ‘abuse of rights’ provides that
States are responsible for their acts ‘which are not unlawful in the sense of being
prohibited’ but cause injury to other States.”218
On the other hand, a warning currently is in order. Failing to ensure that an
organization complies with all laws and regulations increases the odds of liability
and irreparable damage to the organization’s reputation.219 An organization that
signals a lax attitude is tempting for unscrupulous employees, while running a
tight ship means that risk management is part of the corporate culture of
accountability and responsibility.220 The same can be said of nations that turn a
blind eye to rogue actors within their borders. “The rule of law rather than the rule
of unilateral force should apply not only to international relations on the Earth but
also to all activities in and from outer space.”221 Thus, the spirit of the Outer
Space Treaty should always be omnipresent. The treaty should temper cyber
operations with the freedom of exploration and use of outer space.
V.

Conclusion

The truth behind the ill-fated Arctic expedition was cloaked in mystery.
Then, in 1984, “Owen Beattie, a Canadian anthropologist, exhumed . . . three
Beechey Island graves in order to examine, X-ray and autopsy their contents.”222
While the totality of the disaster cannot be fully measured, one clue sheds some
light on the mystery. In the same manner, the analysis presented here
demonstrates the sources of recommendation for cyber policy. As technology
evolves, the means to protect data becomes increasingly sophisticated. But will
these means ever guarantee national security?? There is no doubt that there will
be governments involved in cyber operations designed to interfere with
218
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organizations and national infrastructures abroad and in violation of international
norms. National borders are what create the price differentials that drive the
immense profits of illicit commerce. These also provide shields for criminals to
hide behind, guarding them from law enforcement agencies and governments
seeking to disrupt their activities.”223 This is precisely the problem that emerges
within the activities of governments and those that abuse cyberspace. In other
words, “it is about criminalized states and the future configuration of power
within the state system.224 The nature of cyber activities with apparent ties to
foreign governments needs the immediate intervention of the international
community. Some of these actors seem to serve a particular master, or at a
minimum, they are significantly encouraged to harass other nations by that
master. The landscape of cyberthreats is further complicated because of the
disruption caused by these non-state actors. One prominent group that fits the
definition is Sandworm. This group is known for its use of BlackEnergy, “a
Trojan that is used to conduct DDoS attacks, cyber espionage, and information
destruction attacks,” but has been particularly effective in disrupting ” Industrial
Control Systems.”225 Sandworm is believed to be associated with the General
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, also known as GRU.226
BlackEnergy’s M.O. is as follows: “using spear-phishing emails carrying
malicious Excel documents [or Word] with macros to infect computers in a
targeted network.227 This type of attack may contain the destructive plugin known
as KillDisk, which destroys the “data stored on the infected machine’s hard drive
by overwriting the content of files.”228 These hackers seemingly possess a level of
sophistication beyond standard.229 The question then would be: could Sandworm
be defined as an agent of the Russian government? If the Russian government is
aware, then Sandworm should be considered under the control of Russia. In this
landscape, the rule of “law would indeed serve [stakeholders], not the other way
around, and thus anchor the rule of law properly in [their] very own needs and
223
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aspirations.”230 New space technologies represent a leap in human ingenuity and
innovation. But these also represent unforeseen dangers. “A total of 39 missions
were sent to the Arctic” in search of the lost ships.231 A true mystery, one clue
surfaced over time: the food.232 “The expedition’s tinned food, hailed as cuttingedge technology and stocked in abundance, had been contaminated by lead solder
used to seal the tins and was the most likely culprit.”233 Yet, “the exact
circumstances of their deaths” continue to be shadowed in mystery.234
The nations of the world, particularly in the emerging commercial space
ventures, have a vested interest in protecting their activities in outer space,
including those that rely on satellite network security. “Dream or nightmare, we
have to live our experience as it is, and we have to live it awake. We live in a
world which is penetrated through and through by science and which is both
whole and real.”235 While new space stakeholders progress into a new contested
frontier, the global community watches with hope for a better future.
Nevertheless, there are political considerations that need to be examined based on
the realities of outer space. Space data possess new challenges for CISOs. Indeed,
the race to Mars and beyond will face cyberattacks and all the risks attached to
them. Additionally, the ethical ramifications regarding the regulation of private
activities in space are a new challenge and a new opportunity. The future will be
ripe with opportunities to further evolve the dimensions of outer space commerce,
but only if stakeholders work together to redefine the security landscape of space
objects. The purpose, then, of this future process will be to address the present
cyberthreats that now lurk in outer space. In the perspective of the foregoing
discussion, it is perhaps becoming evident how fundamental the law of outer
space is and how it must evolve with the changing realities of managing
information security. The appropriate scope of inquiry, then, must be tied to
solutions or recommendations that support the ultimate benefit: to protect and
propel the sustainable development of the industry.
The final thought is about the actions at the national and international
stage. It is about the primary motivations behind the present policies and the
limitations described. This article assessed the cyberthreat landscape in outer
space while offering recommendations. Hopefully this report offers guidance on
230
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information security improvements and new policy considerations. If modern
buccaneers wreak havoc on the global landscape, then international cyber policy
should draw inspiration from the rule of law recognized by the Outer Space
Treaty. The lessons of cooperation are as important as the wisdom gained from
future exploration. “An expedition led by Parks Canada [in September 2014]
discovered the wreck of HMS Erebus in an area that had been identified by the
Inuit. Two years later the wreck of HMS Terror was located.”236
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